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COMMENT
Recusal and Recompense: Amending New




The judicial process demands that a judge move within the
framework of relevant legal rules and the covenanted modes of
thought for ascertaining them. He must think dispassionately and
submerge private feeling on every aspect of a case. There is a good
deal of shallow talk that the judicial robe does not change the man
within it. It does. The fact is that on the whole judges do lay aside
private views in discharging their judicial functions .... But it is
also true that reason cannot control the subconscious influence of
feelings of which it is unaware. When there is ground for believing
that such unconscious feelings may operate in the ultimate
judgment, or may not unfairly lead others to believe they are
operating, judges recuse themselves. They do not sit in judgment. I
A fundamental principle of the American legal system is
that judicial proceedings ought to be decided on the merits
by an impartial and unbiased judge.2 In order to protect
both the fairness and dignity of the system, and to ensure
t J.D. Candidate, Class of 2010, University at Buffalo Law School, State
University of New York; B.A., 2006, University at Albany, State University of
New York. I would like to extend many thanks to my parents, Thomas Fiut and
Roseann Fiut, whose support I've depended on throughout the years.
1. Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
recusing himself).
2. RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 33 (2d ed. 2007).
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the right to a fair trial, a judge will recuse3 herself when she
believes that it is not possible for her to be disinterested in
the matter before her.4 Unfortunately, however, this is not
always the case. In the first decade of the twenty-first
century much controversy has resulted from the failure of
judges to recuse themselves in cases in which their
impartiality appears to be in question.5 Consequently,
recusal has become a hot topic of discussion in legal circles
and has received a heightened level of scrutiny by not only
legal experts but also the American press and public.
In New York State-the subject of this Comment-
recusal has received notoriety as a result of the judicial pay
raise controversy. On April 10, 2008, New York Court of
Appeals Chief Judge Judith Kaye sued leaders of the New
York State Assembly and Senate, as well as Governor David
Paterson, demanding a pay raise on behalf of all state
judges.6 Two other lawsuits demanding a pay raise have
3. The term "recuse" refers to a judge removing herself from a case. See
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 231 n.4
(3d ed. 2004). It is often used interchangeably with the term "disqualify," which
is broader in meaning and generally refers to a judge being removed from a case
by another party. See id.; see also William Safire, On Language: Recuse,
J'accuse!, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1989, (Magazine), at 22, 22-24.
4. See Pollak, 343 U.S. at 466-67.
5. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 541 U.S. 913, 922-24 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
mem.) (noting the heated debate in national newspapers over Justice Scalia's
relationship with Vice President Richard Cheney). In Cheney, Scalia refused to
recuse himself from a case where Vice President Dick Cheney was a named
party, despite the fact that he shared a plane with the Vice President and
participated in a duck hunt with him less than two years before the Court heard
the case. Id. at 914-15. As a result of a slew of newspaper editorials lambasting
the Justice for not recusing himself from the case, Scalia took the unusual step
of issuing a separate memorandum opinion addressing the editorials and
explaining why he would not end his participation in the matter. Id. at 915-16.
Cheney was likely the most famous and divisive recusal case of the decade until
the Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., which
will be discussed later. Recusal has garnered attention not only in the United
States but also in international law. See Mats Lewan, Pirate Bay Judge Accused
of Conflict of Interest, CNET NEWS, Apr. 23, 2009, http://news.
cnet.comI8301-1023_3-10226167-93.html (noting an alleged conflict of interest
in a high profile Swedish copyright case).
6. Bruce Golding, Justice of the Cease, N.Y. POST, Apr. 27, 2008, at 4. Kaye
stepped down as chief judge at the end of 2008 after turning seventy years old-
the mandatory retirement age for New York judges. See James Barron, State's
Top Judge, Now 70, Gives Her Farewell Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2008, at
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also been filed by state court judges.7 As a result of these
pay raise lawsuits, several New York judges recused
themselves from cases argued by the law firms of state
legislators.8 Although the judges claimed that their recusal
was a result of the inability to preside impartially,
commentators have suggested that the judges were
attempting to put 9pressure on the legislature to enact the
desired pay raise. Despite Kaye's recent retirement, the
judicial pay raise controversy remains a contentious issue
and is headed for a final showdown in the Court of
Appeals,1" with new Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman having
already stated that he will recuse himself from that case. "
The relationship between judicial recusal and the
judicial pay raise controversy has created the perfect
opportunity to reevaluate and fix New York's recusal law,
which is both "replete with inconsistencies" and without "a
sound theoretical base."'" While federal recusal law has
been revised and updated over the last half-century, 3 New
York continues to rely on an outdated subjective model that
makes a judge the "sole arbiter" of recusal in non-
mandatory areas. 4
This Comment will argue that New York's system of
judicial recusal undermines confidence in the right to a fair.
and impartial trial by allowing judges to sit in cases in
which the judge's impartiality could reasonably be
questioned. It then sets forth a new system of recusal with
A31. Kaye has since been replaced as chief judge by Jonathan Lippman. John
Eligon, Paterson Pick Nominee for Top Judge and Objects That His Choices
Included No Women, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, at A28.
7. See Larabee v. Governor, 880 N.Y.S.2d 256 (App. Div. 2009); Maron v.
Silver, 871 N.Y.S.2d 404 (App. Div. 2008); see also Joel Stashenko, Chief Judge
Steps up Lobbying to Obtain Pay Raises for Judges, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 3, 2009, at 1.
8. Golding, supra note 6.
9. See id.
10. The Court of Appeals is the highest court in the state of New York. N.Y.
CONST. art. VI, § 3.
11. Stashenko, supra note 7.
12. See FLAMM, supra note 2, at 13. While Flamm's comments pertain to
recusal law throughout the country, his words no doubt include New York.
13. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 543-48 (1994) (giving history of
federal recusal laws).
14. People v. Moreno, 516 N.E.2d 200, 202 (N.Y. 1987).
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two salient features: the adoption of an objective recusal
statute and the creation of an independent tribunal to
review recusal petitions. Although this Comment primarily
focuses on explaining and improving recusal law in New
York, the problems identified and subsequent solutions are
applicable to other states as well. 5
This Comment is broken into three parts. Part I will
provide a brief history of recusal law and its development in
the United States. Part I is primarily concerned with
explaining the objective recusal standard first introduced by
the American Bar Association and later incorporated into
federal law.
Part II examines the state of recusal law in New York
and how it has failed to keep up with the reforms seen in
federal law. Section A gives the procedure of how a judge
recuses herself in New York by discussing the shortcomings
of New York's recusal statute and how the Court of Appeals
struck a blow for a strict, objective recusal standard in the
landmark case People v. Moreno.6 Showing the significance
of Moreno, Section B analyzes New York recusal cases that
likely would have been decided differently if the federal
objective standard was used. Section C then looks at New
York advisory opinions concerning recusal and how they
also conflict with the federal standard.
Part III offers steps New York can take to overhaul its
recusal law and set up a system which is fair to litigants
and restores public confidence in the judicial system.
Section A sets forth a new recusal statute which replaces
New York's subjective standard with an objective one
similar to federal law, while Section B proposes the creation
of a special tribunal which will hear and decide recusal
motions. Section C gives a more thorough discussion of the
state's current judicial pay raise controversy and how the
proposed system of recusal would have put an end to the
controversy before it began to fester. The Comment then
15. By no means is New York the only state affected by uncertainty over its
recusal law. The Michigan Supreme Court, for example, recently held a meeting
to consider whether the state should change its rules regarding disqualification.
Editorial, Michigan Parties Weigh in on Caperton v. Massey, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Feb. 22, 2009, at C1. Michigan's current recusal law is similar to New
York's in that it is "essentially up to the judge" in deciding whether to sit or
recuse. Id.
16. 516 N.E.2d 200.
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concludes with a brief discussion as to why it is in New
York's best interest to quickly modernize its recusal law.
Finally, it needs to be noted that the scope of this
Comment is limited to recusal based on a judge's
"extrajudicial" knowledge in both criminal and civil cases.
Extrajudicial refers to knowledge or biases a judge acquires
outside of the case before her.'7 It includes, but is not
limited to, relationships with the attorneys appearing in
front of her as well as hostility towards one of the parties in
the proceeding. I" It does not include knowledge or biases a
judge acquires as a result of information disclosed or
learned during trial. 9 It is this author's belief that prejudice
stemming from an extrajudicial source poses the biggest
threat to the right to a fair and impartial trial.
In addition to being limited to extrajudicial knowledge,
this Comment is also primarily about recusal at the trial
court level. It is at the trial court level that recusal often
has its biggest impact, due in part to the difficulty of
obtaining appellate reversal of a judge's decision not to
recuse herself. It is also at the trial court level that cases
are heard by a single judge who has the ability to exercise
vast influence over the parties and the case itself. Despite
targeting recusal at the trial court level, some of the
suggested reforms can also be applied to appellate judges.
While this Comment does not necessarily suggest that
New York judges have acted improperly due to bias or
interest, it is the appearance of impropriety that needs to be
avoided at all costs in order to ensure public confidence in
the legal system. It is because of this belief that this
Comment sets forth new recusal standards to be adopted by
New York that will restore confidence in the judicial system
and ensure that all cases are decided on the merits.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RECUSAL
The debate over recusal can be traced back centuries
before the founding of the United States. As early as 530
A.D., a judge was encouraged to recuse herself from any
case in which she was interested in order to quell suspicion





as to the fairness of the proceeding."0 During the Middle
Ages there continued to be a "strong . . .abhorrence of
adjudication by a partial judge,"'" but judges were not
actually required to recuse themselves from cases in which
they were interested.22 The lack of a strict prohibition
against a judge sitting in a case in which she might be
interested was largely due to a dearth of judges and the
belief that it was better to have an interested judge preside
rather than no judge at all-a doctrine referred to as the
rule of necessity.23 As the number of judges increased after
the American Revolution, the rule of necessity diminished
in importance, resulting in the codification of stricter
recusal standards.
Recusal was first codified into federal law in 1792 and
required district court judges to recuse themselves in cases
in which they had an interest as well as in cases where they
were previously counsel to a party now appearing in front of
them.l In 1821, recusal was broadened to include "all
judicial relationship or connection with a party that would
in the judge's opinion make it improper to sit."
2 5
It was not until 1911, however, that federal law was
modernized to require district court judges to recuse
themselves for bias. Section 144 of the United States Code,
which is still in effect today, allows a party to file an
affidavit petitioning a district court judge to recuse herself
for "personal bias or prejudice either against him [the
moving party] or in favor of an adverse party. 27
20. Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to
Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 537 n.20 (2005); see also Harrington
Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1923).
21. Joseph M. Godman, Disqualification for Bias of Judicial and
Administrative Officers, 23 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 109, 110 (1948).
22. See Kendra Huard Fershee, Recent Development: Discretionary Recusal
and the Appearance of Partiality Through the Eyes of the Fifth Circuit in
Republic of Panama v. American Tobacco Co., 77 TuL. L. REV. 517, 518 (2002).
23. Godman, supra note 21, at 117; Thomas McKevitt, Note, The Rule of
Necessity: Is Judicial Non-Disqualification Really Necessary?, 24 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 817, 818-19 (1996) (providing a history of the rule of necessity).
24. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 544.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2006).
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In 1948 Congress improved upon § 144 by passing 28
U.S.C. § 455, which is not only broader than § 144, but also
pertains to all federal judges." Section 455 provided:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself
in any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of
counsel, is or has been a material witness, or is so related to or
connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper,
in his opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other
proceeding therein.
29
Section 455 marked an important step in recusal law in
that while a party could still file an affidavit requesting
recusal, a judge was now expected to recuse herself sua
sponte3" when she believed her interest could affect the
trial.
Although §§ 144 and 455 are credited with modernizing
American recusal law, both statutes were criticized for
allowing a judge to be her own arbiter as to whether her
interest was "substantial" enough to warrant recusal. 3' A
standard that allows a judge to use her discretion and look
to her own conscience to determine whether she is biased is
known as a subjective recusal standard. 1 It was because of
this subjective standard and the possibility that judges
would not recuse themselves that § 455 was amended in
1974. 3"
Leading up to the 1974 amendments, the subjective
standard of § 455 was criticized by both the Supreme Court
and the American Bar Association. First, in Commonwealth
Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., the Supreme
Court warned that a judge should be careful to "avoid such
action as may reasonably tend to awaken the suspicion that
his social or business relations or friendships ... constitute
28. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970).
29. Id.
30. The phrase "sua sponte" refers to the court recusing on its own initiative.
31. See Shawn P. Flaherty, Note, Liteky v. United States: The Entrenchment
of an Extrajudicial Source Factor in the Recusal of Federal Judges Under 28
U.S.C. § 455(a), 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 411, 415 (1995) ("[I1n response to increased
criticism of § 455 and the realized and potential abuses that accompany a
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an element in influencing his judicial conduct," and that
judges "not only must be unbiased but also must avoid even
the appearance of bias."3
In a second case, Laird v. Tatum,35 Justice William
Rehnquist refused to recuse himself from a civil liberties
action brought against the United States Army for unlawful
surveillance despite testifying about the alleged activity as
Assistant Attorney General while the appeal was pending.36
Rehnquist's failure to recuse himself in Laird and the fact
that he cast the deciding vote in that controversial case
helped persuade Congress to broaden § 455 and codify parts
of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct."
Canon 3(C)(1) of the 1972 ABA Code of Judicial
Conduct ushered in an entirely new standard for deciding
when a judge should recuse herself 8 Instead of allowing a
judge to use her own discretion in determining whether she
could be impartial in deciding a case, the Code provided
that "a judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."39
This language required a judge to view the situation from
the perspective of a disinterested party and determine
whether it appeared her impartiality might be in doubt. If
34. 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (emphasis added).
35. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
36. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 3, at 232.
37. See id. at 236 n.32.
38. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(1) (1972). The original Code of
Judicial Conduct has evolved throughout the years. In 1990 the ABA adopted
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Am. Bar Ass'n, Center for Professional
Responsibility, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/home.html (last visited Sept. 3,
2009). In the 1990 Model Code, the applicable disqualification section was
moved to 3(E)(1). MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (1990). The
ABA also adopted a revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 2007. James
Sample, David Pozen & Michael Young, Fair Courts: Setting Recusal Standards,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (N.Y.U. Sch. L.), 1998, at 17. As a result, the
disqualification rule is now known as Rule 2.11(A). MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT R. 2.11(A) (2007). Since the disqualification language has essentially
remained the same in each version of the ABA code, this Comment will simply
refer to the ABA provisions as "the Code."
39. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(1) (1972) (emphasis added); see
also LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3 OF THE
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2d ed. 1992) (explaining the scope of the
disqualification canon).
1604 [Vol. 57
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the judge determined that a reasonable person would not
believe she could be impartial, the judge had to recuse
herself. A standard that requires a judge to determine
whether a reasonable person would question the judge's
impartiality is known as an objective recusal standard.'
After the ABA adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct,
Congress completely overhauled § 455 by creating two
distinct recusal provisions." Section 455(b) of the
refurbished statute contains the traditional areas of
mandatory recusal, which requires recusal in certain
situations no matter how disinterested the judge may be.42
In § 455(a), however, Congress adopted the language
from the Code and created a new and remarkably broad
category of recusal. Section 455(a) provides that "[a]ny
justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned."43 Not only did
§ 455(a) constitute a "major improvement for protection of
40. Flaherty, supra note 31, at 416.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)-(b) (2006).
42. Id. § 455(b). Recusal is mandatory:
(1) Where he [the judge] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning
the proceeding, (2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the
matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced
law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter,
or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such
capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning
the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the
particular case in controversy; (4) He knows that he, individually or as
a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a
financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to
the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (5) He or his spouse, or a
person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the
spouse of such a person: (i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer,
director, or trustee of a party; (ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the
proceeding; (iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (iv) Is to the
judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
Id.
43. Id. § 455(a) (emphasis added).
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public confidence"' in the judiciary, it also created a
standard much different than that in § 144 and old § 455:
instead of a subjective standard, federal law now required a
judge to use an objective standard in determining whether
to recuse herself.
In addition to creating an objective standard, another
salient feature of § 455(a) is the replacement of a "bias-in-
fact" standard with an "appearance-of-bias" standard.45 An
appearance of bias standard requires a judge to recuse
herself merely if it appears she might be bias; it is not
relevant whether the judge was unaware of the alleged bias
or if the bias was not factually correct. An appearance of
bias standard also creates an infinite amount of reasons as
to why a judge may have to recuse herself, saving a party
requesting recusal from having to cite to a statutorily
prohibited activity found under the mandatory part of the
recusal statute.
The Supreme Court's subsequent interpretation of
§ 455(a) in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.
confirmed that the section created an objective recusal
standard.' In Liljeberg, the Court held that a federal
district court judge's failure to recuse himself was a
violation of § 455(a) since an "objective observer would have
questioned" the judge's impartiality.47 The Court also noted
that a violation of § 455(a) "does not depend upon whether
or not the judge actually knew of facts creating an
appearance of impropriety, so long as the public might
44. R. Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck, Duck, Recuse? Foreign Common Law
Guidance & Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE. L.
REV. 1799, 1809 (2005). Section 455(a) resembles the old § 455 in that a judge
can either voluntarily recuse herself or can wait until a party brings a motion
requesting recusal and then determine whether to recuse. Compare Kahvedzic
v. Republic of Croatia, 537 U.S. 966 (2003) (denying cert.) (noting that Scalia
took no part in consideration of certiorari petition), with Cheney v. U.S. Dist.
Ct., 541 U.S. 913, 923-24 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.) (noting that Scalia refused to
voluntarily recuse himself and subsequently decided not to recuse after a motion
requesting recusal was brought).
45. Flaherty, supra note 31, at 417.
46. 486 U.S. 847 (1988)
47. Id. at 861.
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reasonably believe that he or she knew."48 Finally, the Court
held:
If it would appear to a reasonable person that a judge has
knowledge of facts that would give him an interest in the
litigation then an appearance of partiality is created even though
no actual partiality exists because the judge does not recall the
facts, because the judge actually has no interest in the case or
because the judge is pure in heart and incorruptible.
49
By adopting a reasonable person standard, the Court
attempted to take the judge's own beliefs and emotions out
of the process and put a judge in the shoes of an objective
observer. It was the Court's stated belief that a reasonable
person standard would "promote public confidence in the
integrity of the judicial process."" By focusing on public
confidence, both the drafters of § 455(a) and the Supreme
Court were aware that the judicial system was dependent in
part on how outsiders perceived it, thus proving that the
integrity of the judicial system and its perception are just as
important as actual fairness and impartiality inside the
courtroom. It is this principal that guides the objective
standard of recusal.
Besides § 455, federal recusal law is also guided by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.5 The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Caperton provides that while most disqualification issues do
not implicate due process, there are certain situations
where the "probability of bias" is high enough to mandate
recusal under the Clause.52
48. Id. at 860. Liljeberg centered around a dispute concerning the awarding of
a certificate from the state of Louisiana for a new hospital. See id. at 852. Ten
months after the trial was decided it came to the attention of the losing party
that the trial court judge was on the board of trustees of Loyola University, who
although was not a named party, still had a substantial financial interest in the
case. See id. at 850. Although the Supreme Court confirmed that the judge had
truly forgotten about Loyola having an interest in the case, it did not matter
since a reasonable person could have doubts about the judge's impartiality. Id.
at 860, 864. As we will see, New York cases that are factually analogous to
Liljeberg do not require recusal. See infra pp. 1616-17.
49. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860.
50. Id.
51. U.S. CONST. amends. V; XIV, § 1.
52. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263 (2009).
2009] 1607
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In Caperton, West Virginia Supreme Court judge Brent
Benjamin refused to recuse himself from a case where one of
the parties donated almost $2.5 million to the judge's
campaign fund while the party's appeal was pending before
the state supreme court. In his majority opinion, Justice
Kennedy noted that the Due Process Clause had previously
been used to mandate recusal in two situations: where a
judge was found to have a financial interest in the case, and
where a judge had participated in an earlier proceeding and
was subsequently asked to determine the propriety of her
actions in a later proceeding. 4 Kennedy held that this case
created a third situation where due process required
recusal 5
Like § 455, the Court noted that due process did not
require a consideration as to whether Benjamin was
actually biased. 6  Instead, "[d]ue process requires an
objective inquiry into whether the contributor's influence on
the election under all the circumstances 'would offer a
possible temptation to the average . . . judge to ... lead him
not to hold the balance, nice, clear and true."'57
Although it is not immediately clear what impact
Caperton will have on recusal, it appears that the case is
relatively narrow. For example, the Court warned that
Caperton was an "extreme" case that addressed an
"extraordinary situation."" It is also unclear whether
Caperton will be extended beyond judicial election cases.
Thus, Caperton and its interpretation of the Due Process
53. Id. at 2256-57. Interestingly, John Grisham's 2008 novel The Appeal is
based on the facts of Caperton. Joan Biskupic, At the Supreme Court, a Case
with the Feel of a Best Seller, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 2009, at 1A. The Appeal tells
the story of a state court judge who does not recuse himself from a case
involving a chemical corporation despite being recruited and backed by the
corporation during the previous judicial election. JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL
(2008).
54. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260-62.
55. Id. at 2263-64.
56. Id. at 2263.
57. Id. at 2264 (emphasis added) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532
(1927)).
58. Id. at 2265. Justice Roberts believed otherwise, stating in his dissent that
courts will be "forced to deal with a wide variety of Caperton motions, each




Clause will likely not supersede § 455, but may allow the
objective language from that statute to be applied to state
courts in certain situations. In any event, states are still
allowed to adopt recusal standards that are stricter than
both § 455 and the Due Process Clause.59 Indeed, this
Comment urges New York to do just that.
In concluding this section, it should be noted that
despite its objective recusal standard, federal recusal law
has one major flaw: allowing a judge whose recusal is
sought to be the arbiter of whether to recuse herself.6" This
issue presented itself in Microsoft Corp. v. United States
when Justice Rehnquist applied § 455(a) to himself and
determined that a reasonable person would not think he
was partial towards Microsoft, a company his son worked
for.6' Therefore, although § 455(a) tries to remove a judge's
conscious and subconscious feelings from the recusal
process, it is still largely dependent on whether a judge
believes recusal is proper.2 This has the effect of
endangering the objective language of § 455(a) and shows
that the best recusal statute not only contains objective
language but also ensures that it is applied properly by
taking the judge whose recusal is sought out of the decision
making process. The new system of recusal set forth in Part
III of this Comment does just that.
In spite of the danger of allowing a challenged judge to
decide a motion requesting her own recusal, § 455(a) helps
ensure a fair trial by not only providing a method for
litigants to seek a judge's recusal, but also a uniform
standard that takes a common sense approach as to
whether a judge is fit to preside over a matter. The
popularity of the objective language used in § 455(a) is
reflected in the fact that as of 2008 forty-seven states have
adopted it into their judicial conduct codes.63 New York is
59. See generally Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
60. See Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the
Judges?, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 543, 559 (1994) ("[The challenged judge is perhaps
the last person who should rule on the [recusal] motion.").
61. 530 U.S. 1301 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., mem.).
62. See Abramson, supra note 60, for a discussion on deciding recusal
motions, including an alternate system where a challenged judge transfers the
recusal motion to a different judge.
63. Sample et al., supra note 38, at 17 (noting Michigan, Montana, and Texas
as the exceptions). Montana recently adopted the ABA standard into its 2008
2009] 1609
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included as one of the above forty-seven states. 6'
Unfortunately, however, the state has chosen not to make
the language binding on its judges.65 Instead, New York
judges use their discretion in determining whether to recuse
themselves.' The combination of a subjective recusal
standard and the ability of a judge to decide her own recusal
motion has resulted in cases tainted with the appearance of
impropriety and a potential loss of confidence in the right to
a fair trial.
II. RECUSAL IN NEW YORK
A. New York's Subjective Standard
Judiciary Law section 14 is New York's statutory
recusal provision.67 Although the statute dates back to the
nineteenth century, it was amended and codified at section
14 in 1945.68 Unlike § 455, section 14 is organized as one
section and provides for mandatory recusal in only four
instances: (1) when the judge is a party in the matter before
her; (2) when she has been attorney or counsel in the
matter; (3) when she is "interested"; or (4) if she is related
by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth degree to a
party before her.69 Section 14 also provides that a judge
need not disqualify herself simply because she is a policy
Code of Judicial Conduct, to be effective starting in 2009, and Texas follows the
ABA standard by rule. Thus, Michigan remains the lone hold out. See Brief of
the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party
at 17 n.40, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22),
2009 WL 45973. However, it should be noted that this does not mean that all
the states that have adopted the language of § 455(a) into their judicial codes
have made the language binding.
64. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 100.3(E) (2006).
65. See People v. Moreno, 516 N.E.2d 200, 201 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that
recusal is a "discretionary decision . . .within the personal conscience of the
court"); In re Murphy, 626 N.E.2d 48, 50 (N.Y. 1993) ('The Code of Judicial
Conduct requires a Judge's recusal when his or her 'impartiality might be
questioned.' Absent a legal disqualification, however[,] a Judge is generally the
sole arbiter of recusal. .. ").
66. See Moreno, 516 N.E.2d at 201.





holder of an insurance company that appears before her or
if she owns stock or securities of a corporate litigant.7"
The lack of a "catch all" provision makes section 14 an
inadequate recusal statute. Unlike the federal statute,
section 14 does not contain a section providing for a judge's
recusal when her impartiality might be in question.
Although the requirement that a judge recuse herself when
she is "interested" may have been intended by the drafters
of section 14 as a catch all,7" its scope has since been
limited, and it is now acknowledged that the type of interest
required for a judge's recusal is "an interest as a party or in
a pecuniary or property right from which he might profit or
lose." Because of the narrow scope of section 14, many
types of interests that would result in recusal under
§ 455(a) are not grounds for recusal in New York.
To possibly make up for the inadequacies of section 14,
New York adopted the ABA model language found in
§ 455(a) into its Rules of Judicial Conduct.73 Section
100.3(E) of the Rules is nearly identical to § 455, containing
a section on mandatory recusal as well as a section
requiring recusal when "the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned." 4  However, in the 1987
"landmark"75 case of People v. Moreno, the Court of Appeals
held section 14 is the rule of law in New York, thus
70. Id.
71. Godman, supra note 21, at 114.
72. In re Estate of Sherburne, 476 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421 (Sur. Ct. 1984).
73. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 100.3(E) (2006). The Rules of
Judicial Conduct are also sometimes referred to as 'The Code of Judicial
Conduct," e.g., Connor v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 260 F. Supp.
2d 517, 519 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), or the rules "Governing Judicial Conduct," see In re
Tyler, 553 N.E.2d 1316, 1317 (N.Y. 1990). However, the Code of Judicial
Conduct is usually understood to be the ABA rules. See, e.g., Pearson, supra
note 44; see also People v. Garson, 848 N.E.2d 1264, 1281 (N.Y. 2006)
(distinguishing between the Rules of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Judicial
Conduct). Thus, when referring to title 22, this Comment will use either the
Rules of Judicial Conduct or the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct.
74. § 100.3(E).




eliminating any chance section 100.3(E) could be treated as
binding law.76
Two distinct holdings from Moreno and one indirect
effect of that case shape present day recusal law in New
York. First, the Court of Appeals held that a judge is the
sole arbiter of recusal so long as one of the four mandatory
areas of recusal is not present.77 Being the "sole arbiter" of
recusal allows a judge to use her discretion and listen to her"personal conscience" in determining whether to recuse
herself.7"
The second holding of Moreno sets forth an "abuse of
discretion" standard for appellate review of recusal.79 Under
the abuse of discretion standard of review, "[a] reviewing
court will accord a lower court's disqualification decision
great weight and substantial deference." The use of this
standard of review has resulted in a judge's decision not to
recuse herself "seldom be[ing] disturbed on appeal."'"
Additionally, Moreno requires a party appealing a judge's
decision not to recuse herself to present not only evidence of
the judge's bias, but also evidence that the bias affected the
result of the trial.8 2 This requirement has resulted in the
strange situation of an appellate court agreeing that the
trial court judge was indeed biased, but that the appellants
did not prove that the bias affected the outcome of the
trial.8 3
Finally, an indirect effect of Moreno is that it
discourages a party from seeking a judge's recusal due to
fear of inciting the judge. As some commentators have
noted: "[riecusal motions are not like other procedural
76. 516 N.E.2d 200 (N.Y. 1987).
77. Id. at 201.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 203.
80. FLAMM, supra note 2, at 984.
81. Id. at 991.
82. Moreno, 516 N.E.2d at 203.
83. See, e.g., Schrager v. N.Y. Univ., 642 N.Y.S.2d 243, 244 (App. Div. 1996);
see also Schwartzberg v. Kingsbridge Heights Care Ctr., Inc. 813 N.Y.S.2d 191,
193 (App. Div. 2006) ("Although the ethical standards of judicial conduct require
the avoidance of the appearance of impropriety, an ethical violation does not
necessarily warrant reversal and a new trial.').
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motions. They challenge the fundamental legitimacy of the
adjudication. They also challenge the judge in a very
personal manner: they speculate on her interests and
biases; they may imply unattractive things about her."'
Thus, rather than submitting a recusal motion that has
little chance for success, a party may decide to take its
chances in front of a possibly biased judge.
Although Moreno grants them broad discretion in
determining whether to recuse, New York judges can
request an advisory opinion from the New York State
Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics (ACJE) on whether
they should recuse themselves. 5 The ACJE was created in
1987 (the same year Moreno was decided) to "help New York
State's judges and justices adhere to the high standards set
forth in the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct." 6 The
creation of the ACJE is now codified in the New York
Judiciary Law. 7 Each year the ACJE issues "approximately
140 to 220 opinions annually in response to questions from
judges, justices, and quasi-judicial officers" regarding their
own conduct."8
Unlike case law applying the Moreno standard, advisory
opinions issued by the ACJE often propose recusal when it
appears a reasonable person may suspect the judge's
impartiality might be in question. 9 Although advisory
opinions are nonbinding,9 ° "[a]ctions of any judge or justice
... taken in accordance with findings or recommendations
contained in an advisory opinion issued by the panel shall
be presumed proper for the purposes of any subsequent
investigation by the state commission on judicial conduct."'"
Therefore, although a judge is under no obligation to seek
84. Sample et al., supra note 38, at 31.
85. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, About the ACJE: Organization and
Purpose, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/acje/whatis.shtml (last visited Sept. 3,
2009).
86. Id.
87. Id.; see also N.Y. JUD. LAW § 212(2)() (McKinney 2005).
88. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, supra note 85.
89. See infra Part II.C.




BUFFALO LA W REVIEW
an advisory opinion, and can still rely upon Moreno in
determining whether to recuse herself, she can protect
herself from subsequent punishment by seeking an opinion
from the ACJE and following its recommendations.
In spite of the objective standard provided for in the
New York Rules of Judicial Conduct and the creation of the
ACJE, Moreno remains the rule of law in New York. As a
result, recusal motions that would likely succeed in federal
court fail in New York state courts, thus creating what a
reasonable person would consider "the appearance of
impropriety."
B. Post-Moreno Case Law
In the twenty plus years since Moreno, New York case
law has reinforced the position of the Court of Appeals that
a judge should use her discretion in determining whether to
recuse herself. Very few of these decisions hold that a judge
should have recused herself in the underlying case. More
importantly, some of the appellate decisions affirming a
judge's decision not to recuse would have came out
differently if an objective standard was used. As a result,
New York judges sometimes preside in cases in which they
likely could not in federal court.
This section looks at cases in which a judge would likely
have been forced to recuse herself if an objective standard
was used and how a reasonable person might view the
judge's refusal to recuse herself as creating the appearance
of impropriety. All of the cases come from one of New York's
four appellate divisions, which are the state's intermediate
appeals courts.92 The appellate division reviews decisions of
state supreme courts and county courts, both of which are
courts of original instance in criminal and civil matters.93
The following cases can be organized into three different
categories: prejudice against a party, prejudice against an
attorney, and having an interest in the matter. It should be
noted that this is not a complete list of cases that conflict
with the federal standard, but instead highlights common
92. See N.Y. State Unified Court Sys., Appellate Divisions,





situations in which a New York judge is not required to
recuse herself. "
1. Prejudice Against a Party. It would be nearly
impossible for a judge to recuse herself simply because she
recognizes a party. For example, many counties in New
York are primarily rural and have small populations,95
making it all but certain there are times when a trial court
judge is familiar with the party appearing before her. In
some instances, however, a judge's relationship or feelings
towards a party may go beyond what is acceptable.
First, in People v. A.S. Goldmen, Inc., the defendants'
codefendant "was charged with hiring someone to murder
the court."96 The threat likely resulted from the trial court
case in which several defendants were convicted for
corruption and other business related crimes.97 Because of
the threat, the codefendant's trial was severed and tried
separately from the remaining defendants' case, leading the
remaining defendants to seek the judge's recusal." In
denying the defendants' appeal challenging the trial court's
failure to recuse, the appellate court cited to Moreno and
held that "there was no indication that the court could not
remain fair and impartial to the remaining defendants."99
Although, the defendants in A.S. Goldmen were not accused
in any way of being connected to the murder plot,"° the
nature of the threat and the court's failure to recuse raises
the issue of whether the judge could remain neutral towards
the remaining defendants.
In a second case, People v. Wallis, the trial court judge
presided over an earlier, unrelated family court case
94. It should also be noted that recusal case law is inherently incomplete
because of the widely held belief that a judge need not disclose the reason for
her recusal. FLAMM, supra note 2, at 12.
95. For example, Washington County, New York, is "largely agricultural in
nature and has no cities within its borders." Washington County N.Y., About
Washington County New York, http://www.co.washington.ny.us/about.htm (last
visited Sept. 3, 2009).
96. 779 N.Y.S.2d 489, 491 (App. Div. 2004).
97. Id. at 490.





involving the defendant in which the judge had referred to
the defendant as being "scum" and a "predator."'0 ' In
reviewing the case, the appellate court ruled that the judge
properly refused to recuse since "the judge had no
recollection [of callin the defendant names] until being
shown the transcript." 02
Unlike A.S. Goldmen, the judge in Wallis was clearly
prejudiced towards the party in front him. Although the
bias occurred in an earlier case, the judge was reminded of
it after being shown the transcript from the family court
case. The judge's comments and history with the defendant
thus raised the possibility that he was not capable of being
impartial in the case at hand.
Although it can be argued that a reasonable person
would not question the judge's impartiality in A.S.
Goldmen, the judge in Wallis would have had to recuse
himself under the federal objective standard because of the
case's similarity to Liljeberg. In Liljeberg, the federal
district court judge presided in a case in which an
organization the judge once worked for was an interested
third party.0 3 Although the Supreme Court confirmed that
the district court judge had truly forgotten about the
organization having an interest in the case, the Court held
that it did not make a difference since the inquiry is not
whether the judge is impartial, but whether a reasonable
person might question the judge's impartiality."° Just like
Liljeberg, the judge in Wallis was presumably unaware -of
his relationship with the party appearing in front of him.0 o
But, because of the judge's harsh comments towards the
defendant, a reasonable person might very well question
whether the judge was capable of being impartial.
In a third case, People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, the trial
court judge also likely would have had to recuse himself if
an objective recusal standard was used. In Grasso, the state
Attorney General brought an action against the former CEO
of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) challenging
101. 806 N.Y.S.2d 760, 762 (App. Div. 2005).
102. Id.
103. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 850 (1988).
104. Id. at 860-61.
105. Compare id., with Wallis, 806 N.Y.S.2d 760.
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compensation and benefits awarded to the CEO."0 The trial
court judge refused to recuse himself even though he had at
one time been under consideration for a position on the
NYSE's Board of Directors. °7 In requesting recusal, the
defendant argued that the judge may have harbored bias
toward him since the NYSE did not offer the judge a
position on its Board of Directors. °8 The appellate court
affirmed the judge's decision not to recuse himself,
reasoning that the NYSE's failure to offer the judge a
position on the Board did not "predispose[ ] the Judge to
reach any particular conclusion in [the] litigation."'"
A reasonable person might question whether the judge
was affected in some way by the NYSE's failure to offer him
a position. Again, although the judge in Grasso was likely
not influenced by his involvement with the NYSE and the
defendant, there was still an appearance of impropriety.
Because of the sensitive nature of seeking employment with
a prestigious institution such as the NYSE, it is not
unreasonable to think that the judge was incapable of being
impartial.
106. 853 N.Y.S.2d 64, 65-66 (App. Div. 2008).
107. Id. at 66.
108. Id. at 68.
109. Id. In addition to using a subjective standard to hold that the judge was
not'biased, the appellate court in Grasso also based its decision on the fact that
both parties agreed at the beginning of the litigation that the judge's
involvement with the New York Stock Exchange was not a basis for recusal. Id.
Seeking the consent of the parties to preside even though there appears to be a
conflict of interest is a doctrine known as "remittal." See MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(C) (2007); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
22 § 100.3(F) (2006). While remittal is specifically allowed in the Rules of
Judicial Conduct, New York case law provides that "a judge disqualified under a
statute cannot act even with the consent of the parties interested, because the
law was not designed merely for the protection of the parties to the suit, but for
the general interests of justice." In re City of Rochester, 101 N.E. 875, 876 (N.Y.
1913); see also Beer Garden, Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 590 N.E.2d 1193,
1198 (N.Y. 1992). Therefore, since a judge cannot preside in a case prohibited by
section 14, one would think that the consent of the parties should not be a factor
in considering whether there should be recusal. Thus, there appears to be a
conflict between the rule of remittal and the New York Rules of Judicial
Conduct. See Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a
Judge's Impartiality 'Might Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 55, 62-64 (2000) (discussing remittal in the 1972 Code of Judicial
Conduct and the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct).
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The purpose of an objective standard is to not only
ensure that trials are decided on the merits, but to also
promote confidence in the judicial system. The failure to
scrutinize the judges' relationships in Grasso, A.S.
Goldmen, and Wallis not only allows a judge to sit in a case
in which she might be biased, but also ignores the
importance of the public's perception of the judicial system.
2. Prejudice Against an Attorney. A judge can be
familiar with a party appearing before her, but it is more
common for a judge to be familiar with an attorney."'
Although a per se rule against a judge hearing a case in
which she is familiar with an attorney would be virtually
impossible, there are certainly instances in which a judge
should recuse herself because of the relationship. The
following cases are examples of when a judge's bias against
an attorney creates an appearance of impropriety.
In Berman v. Herbert Color Lithographers Corp., the
plaintiff argued that the trial judge should have recused
because of "past friction" with one of the attorneys who
represented the plaintiff.' Because of the adversarial
nature of any trial, it is not uncommon for judges and
attorneys to develop animosity towards each other.
Although it is debatable whether "past friction" is enough to
warrant recusal under the objective standard, it would be a
better practice for the judge to at least consider how a
reasonable person would view the relationship.
A second case, People v. Daly,"2 is an example of a
relationship between a judge and attorney that goes beyond
mere "friction." In Daly, the defendant argued that the trial
court judge should have recused because of the judge's
"hatred" of defense counsel."3 On appeal, the appellate court
refused to reverse the trial court judge's decision, reasoning
that since recusal was not required by section 14, the
decision to recuse was left to the "conscience and discretion
of the judge.""' 4
110. See Jeremy M. Miller, Judicial Recusal and Disqualification: The Need
for a Per Se Rule on Friendship (Not Acquaintance), 33 PEPP. L. REV. 575, 612-14
(2006) (giving examples of how a judge and attorney may develop a friendship).
111. 636 N.Y.S.2d 98, 99 (App. Div. 1995).
112. 799 N.Y.S.2d 537 (App. Div. 2005).




Hatred of an attorney would surely require recusal
under the federal standard since a reasonable person would
be suspicious of a judge's motives if she hated an attorney
who was arguing before her. Although bias stemming from
hatred may not be enough to change the outcome of the
case, it could be enough to result in unfavorable rulings or
hurt an attorney's confidence in presenting a case. Because
of these potential affects, recusal would be the appropriate
move in this situation.
While Berman and Daly concern a judge being
prejudiced against an attorney, just the opposite may be
true: a judge may favor an attorney. An accepted feature of
our legal system is that judges often get to the bench
because of who they know.' This also applies in New York,
where many judges were once practicing attorneys. 116 In the
words of Justice Scalia, it would be "utterly disabling""'7 to
require a judge to recuse herself simply because she has a
relationship-good or bad-with an attorney. However, as
the above two cases illustrate, that relationship may
sometimes be stretched too far and take on the appearance
of impropriety. Adopting the federal standard would allow a
judge (or an independent body)"8 to objectively determine
whether the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. Although a judge is likely being honest when
reasoning that she can be impartial when hearing a case
where a friend is an attorney, this should not be the inquiry.
Instead, it should be whether a reasonable person might
believe the judge is not impartial-a standard with which
Berman and Daly conflict.
3. Having an Interest in the Matter. A third set of cases
consists of those where the judge can be considered to have
115. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 541 U.S. 913, 916 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.)
(noting that many Supreme Court justices made the Court because they were
friends with the President); see also Matt Chandler, Nominating Commission
Outlines Possible Changes, BUFFALO L.J., July 23, 2009, at 4. (discussing how a
lack of political ties hurts the chances of well qualified lawyers to obtain
judgeships).
116. Reflecting this fact, New York recusal case law is in agreement that a
judge who, as a district attorney, prosecuted a defendant now appearing before
her does not need to recuse herself. See, e.g., People v. Call, 731 N.Y.S.2d 557,
559 (App. Div. 2001); People v. Rosato, 599 N.Y.S.2d 195, 196 (App. Div. 1993).
117. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 916.
118. See infra Part III.A.2.
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some sort of interest in the case before her. Having an
interest in a case is different than favoring or hating a party
or attorney in that it is the actual subject matter of the
litigation that the judge may have an interest in.
One type of interest a judge may have in the matter is
when she is familiar with the victim of a crime that is now
being prosecuted. In People v. Griffiths, the trial court judge
was presiding over an arson case in which the victim of the
arson was a blood relative of the judge. 19 In reviewing the
judge's decision not to recuse, the court held section 14's
prohibition against a judge sitting in a case in which she is
related to the party did not apply since a victim is not a
party to a crime. 120Then, applying the Moreno standard, the
court subsequently held that the judge did not abuse his
discretion in declining to recuse himself.' Although the
trial court judge in Griffiths denied the recusal motion in
part because he claimed not to have had contact with the
victim in ten years,'22 the mere fact that the judge was
deciding a case involving a family member makes the
judge's impartiality questionable.
In a second case, People v. Duffy, the judge declined to
recuse himself in a vehicular manslaughter case in which
the deceased victim was a friend of the judge's wife and the
judge's brother-in-law was a witness for the defense.
2 1
Citing to Griffiths, the appellate court first held that the
judge was not required to recuse himself since there was no
statutory disqualification under section 14.124 The court also
held that the judge was not required to recuse himself since
there was a lack of "any serious question of the Judge's
impartiality."'2 5 Again, it is debatable whether the trial
court judge was biased against either party because of his
relationship with the victim and witness. However, in a
sensitive case such as this where the victim is deceased and
the judge's wife was a friend of the victim, the better









practice would be for the judge to recuse rather than
creating an appearance of impropriety.
A final type of judicial interest is found in Borrell v.
Hanophy.'26 In Borrell, the judge who presided over the
defendant's arraignment was a witness to the crime
allegedly committed by the defendant.'27 The appellate court
subsequently refused to stop the trial from proceeding since
there was no statutory provision requiring the judge's
recusal.'E8 Although the trial court judge in Borrell merely
arraigned the defendant, it likely would have been a simple
procedure for the judge to transfer the case to another
judge. By refusing to do so, the judge not only created
grounds for the defendant to appeal the recusal decision,
but also allowed his actions to be scrutinized. Again, the
better practice would have been for the trial court judge to
recuse.
When the three types of cases examined in this
section-where the judge is familiar with the party, familiar
with the attorney, and appears to be interested in the
matter-are considered as a whole, the breadth of the dual
holdings of Moreno can be fully appreciated. Not only is a
judge allowed to sit in cases in which her impartiality is in
question, but the appellate courts also essentially
rubberstamp the judge's decision not to remove herself from
the case.'29 While these cases do not suggest that the judge
is actually biased, they give the impression that the judge
may be allowing other factors besides the merits of the case
to guide her decision making. It should be the goal of New
York State to prevent this type of situation. To achieve this
goal and promote judicial ethics, the state created the
ACJE.
126. 667 N.Y.S.2d 312 (App. Div. 1998).
127. Id. at 313.
128. Id.
129. As previously mentioned, appellate courts rarely overturn a judge's
decision not to recuse herself. However, an appellate court did find that the
court should have recused itself when the judge heard twenty-one matters
brought by an attorney who was the judge's "close friend, business associate and
personal attorney." In re Intemann, 540 N.E.2d 236, 237 (N.Y. 1989). A second
example was when the judge heard a case brought by a party whom the judge
had borrowed money from in the past. In re Murphy, 626 N.E.2d 48, 50 (N.Y.




C. New York State Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics
Advisory Opinions
As previously mentioned, the ACJE issues opinions in
response to questions asked by judges, justices, and quasi-
judicial officers concerning recusal. 0 Although some of the
ACJE opinions suggest that the Committee endorses the
use of the objective standard found in the Rules of Judicial
Conduct, others allow a judge to use her discretion in
deciding whether to recuse herself. Similar to Section B
above, this section analyzes advisory opinions that involve
both a judge's relationship with a party and a judge's
relationship with an attorney. Unlike Section B, it will not
analyze advisory opinions concerning a judge's interest in
the matter before her. This section is by no means a
complete list of recusal advisory opinions. Instead, the
opinions chosen for discussion highlight the fact that
although the ACJE is at times more objective than the
appellate divisions, it is still not completely supportive of
the objective standard found in the Rules of Judicial
Conduct. Even worse, these opinions show that the ACJE is
at times inconsistent when it comes to recusal.
1. A Judge's Relationship with a Party. The relationship
between a judge and a party sometimes raises questions
regarding the judge's impartiality. Advisory opinions issued
by the ACJE reflect the fact that a judge should recuse
herself if she is too familiar with a party. For example, the
ACJE suggests recusal when a judge is on the board of
directors for a hospital that appears as a party;' when a
party was a client of the judge's law firm within the last two
years; 132 and when a party appearing in front of the judge is
a town councilperson in charge of adjusting the judge's
salary.133 These opinions show that the ACJE favors recusal
130. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text; see also George D. Marlow,
Opinions of the New York State Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics: Their
Language and Rhetoric, N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov. 1997, at 32.
131. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 00-18 (2000),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/ udicialethicsopinions/00-18_.htm.
132. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 97-85 (2000),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/judicialethics/opinions/97-85_.htm.




without allowing a judge to even consider whether she is
capable of being impartial.
In spite of the above opinions, the ACJE does not
always require recusal when a judge is familiar with a
party. For example, one ACJE opinion provides that a judge
need not recuse herself even if she has filed a criminal
harassment complaint against the party appearing before
her.'34 Besides conflicting with other opinions, this opinion
is also factually similar to Wallis, where the appellate court
affirmed a judge's decision not to recuse even though the
judge had previously referred to the party as being "scum"
and "a predator."'35 Instead of allowing these inconsistencies
to occur, the ACJE would be better off taking a completely
objective stance on judge-party relations as set forth in the
Rules of Judicial Conduct.
2. A Judge's Relationship with an Attorney. Similar to a
judge's relationship with a party, some advisory opinions for
judge-attorney relationships require recusal while others
make it discretionary. For example, the ACJE suggests
recusal when a judge's landlord appears as an attorney
before the judge;' 36 when a town board member in charge of
the judge's salary appears as an attorney;'37 and when a
judge has previously consulted the attorney for private legal
advice over a period of two years.'
The ACJE does not, however, require a judge to recuse
herself if an attorney has filed a complaint against the judge
with the Commission on Judicial Conduct,' 39 or if the
attorney commenced a suit against the judge for her
conduct as a county official before the judge came to the
134. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 99-78 (1999),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ipjudicialethics/opinions/99-78_.htm.
135. See People v. Wallis, 806 N.Y.S.2d 760, 762 (App. Div. 2005).
136. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 92-110 (1992), http:/www.
courts.state.ny.usipjudicialethics/opinions/92- 110_.pdf.
137. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 94-61 (1994),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/judicialethics/opinions/94-61-.pdf.
138. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 06-16 (2006),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/judicialethics/opinions/06-16.htm.




bench.'" Instead, the ACJE allows the judge to preside so
long as she believes she can remain impartial. 4 Whereas
the first set of opinions are good examples of the ACJE
believing a reasonable person would object to a judge sitting
in those situations, the opinions that allow a judge to use
her discretion are nearly identical to Daly, a case that uses
the Moreno standard.
Both of the above subsections show that while the ACJE
occasionally suggests a judge recuse herself regardless of
whether the judge believes she can be impartial, it is also
willing to put the recusal decision in the judge's hands. The
ACJE should certainly be applauded for trying to bring a
level of objectivity to the issue of recusal. However, when
reading its opinions one gets the sense that the ACJE is
torn between applying the standard found in the Rules of
Judicial Conduct-the Rules it was designed to interpret-
and complying with the Moreno standard set forth by the
Court of Appeals. This tension shows that the ACJE is
receptive to the idea of an objective standard of recusal, but
might not believe that it has total authority to apply such a
standard.
The ACJE, although partly to blame, is just part of a
larger problem. New York recusal law is broken and in dire
need of a clear and effective system of recusal. Without a
clear standard, New York recusal law will continue to be a
crazy quilt consisting of an outdated statute, unenforced
regulations, disillusioned courts, and an ethics committee
that is both powerless and inconsistent.
III. A NEW SYSTEM OF RECUSAL FOR NEW YORK
As this Comment strives to point out, there is much to
dislike about New York recusal law. This does not mean the
law is arbitrary, and there are a few benefits to New York's
recusal law worth noting. First, it limits the amount of
frivolous recusal motions. For example, if New York allowed
a party to secure a judge's recusal upon demand, a litigant
might be tempted to continuously file recusal motions until
she ends up with a judge she believes is favorable to her





cause.142 Second, and similar to the first benefit, if recusal
became a common practice, the judicial system would be
flooded with recusal requests and become more stressed
than it already is.'43
In spite of these legitimate concerns, New York's system
of recusal is insufficient and needs to be changed. It is the
goal of Part III of this Comment to provide a blueprint for
how New York can fix its recusal law without hurting the
efficiency and effectiveness of the judicial system. Section A
sets forth a new system of recusal that ensures recusal
motions are decided both objectively and efficiently. Section
B explains the judicial pay raise controversy and how a new
system would alleviate concerns about judicial recusal in
respect to the controversy. Part III concludes with why it is
in New York's best interest to act quickly in changing its
law.
A. Independent Review of Recusal Motions Using an
Objective Standard
1. Codifying the Regulations. The first step New York
needs to take to update its recusal law is to change
Judiciary Law section 14. Realizing the inherent
inadequacy of a completely subjective recusal provision, the
federal government amended its own subjective statute in
1974 and adopted the objective model language of the
American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct.
Furthermore, the ABA continues to critique the federal
standard and is currently preparing a report analyzing
recusal law throughout the country.' Instead of following
the ABA and the federal government's initiative, New York
has continued to rely on section 14-a statute that has
remained unaltered since 1945.145 Fortunately, since New
York has adopted the federal standard as part of its Rules of
Judicial Conduct, a quick fix for section 14 would be to
completely replace it with the standard found in the Rules
142. See Pearson, supra note 44, at 1811-12; see also In re Mason, 916 F.2d
384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (warning against a system of recusal
that allows "preemptory strikes and judge-shopping').
143. See Sample et al., supra note 38, at 32.
144. Id. at 18.
145. See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 14 (McKinney 2005).
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and add to it the reasonable person language from Liljeberg.
The non-mandatory part of the amended statute would thus
read like this:
Any justice or judge of the State of New York shall disqualify
herself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might
reasonably be questioned by a reasonable person.
The second part of the statute would then consist of the
traditional areas of mandatory recusal.
Anything short of replacing section 14 with the objective
standard would be an inadequate solution to fixing New
York's recusal law. Although New York attempted to make
recusal more objective when it adopted its Rules of Judicial
Conduct, the Rules have little impact because of Moreno.
The Court of Appeals' reliance on section 14 in spite of the
Rules is especially troubling since it was the goal of the
Rules to encourage New York judges to adhere to a new set
of "high standards."' 146 Amending New York statutory law
and removing the subjective language of section 14 is the
only way to give an objective standard the actual force of
law and have it recognized by New York courts.
Replacing section 14 with the objective language found
in the federal standard and the Rules would also have the
effect of statutorily superseding Moreno, which was based in
large part on the fact that section 14 only required a judge's
recusal in four specific instances. In deciding whether the
judge in Moreno should have recused himself, the Court of
Appeals was likely attempting to fill the void created by the
narrow language of section 14 and thus adopted a standard
that applied to areas outside of the mandatory language of
the statute. As a result of the new standard, trial court
judges were under little pressure to recuse themselves in
cases in which they might appear interested.
47
146. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, supra note 85.
147. One New York judge has likened a judge's discretionary decision to recuse
as "allow[ing] judicial foxes to continue to watch the hen house." People v. T & C
Design, Inc., 680 N.Y.S.2d 832, 835 (Just. Ct. 1998). The judge in TC. Design
took the unprecedented step of referring the question of whether he should
recuse to an associate justice. Id. Unfortunately, T.C. Design is only a Justice
Court case. Id. at 832. Although Shepardizing the case reveals that it has had
little to no impact on the way a trial court judge views a recusal motion, the
opinion serves as a good reference to how one judge believes New York's recusal
law is inadequate and in need of change. See id.
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Furthermore, some judges took the position that they had
an affirmative obligation not to recuse themselves.'48
Replacing section 14 with an objective standard will have
the effect of ending Moreno's provision that a judge is the"sole arbiter" of recusal and will also take discretion out of
the decision making process.
It will likely be argued by supporters of the current New
York recusal law that an objective standard would lead to a
rash of recusals that strains the already burdened court
system. While it is true that an objective standard will
likely disqualify more judges than a subjective standard,
the system will not be strained. There are currently more
than 3,000 full- and part-time judges in the state of New
York, most of which preside in trial courts.'49 In the Eighth
Judicial District alone, there are twenty-six state Supreme
Court judges. 5 0 Due to the high number of judges, it will not
be a problem for a judge to transfer the case to a judge from
the same court.'5' If for some reason it is a problem, an
arrangement can be made to move the case to a different
venue where an impartial judge can preside. In any event,
the importance of deciding all cases on the merits without
bias outweighs the slight inconvenience posed by an
148. Spremo v. Babchik, 589 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1022 (Sup. Ct. 1992) ("A judge has
an obligation not to recuse himself or herself, even if sued in connection with his
or her duties, unless he or she is satisfied that he or she is unable to serve with
complete impartiality, in fact or appearance.'). Spremo refers to a doctrine
known as "the duty to sit." See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William's Ghost: The
Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 813 (2009)
(describing the prevalence of the duty to sit in both federal and state law); see
also Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the
Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107 (2004)
(describing the duty to sit in federal law).
149. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, supra note 85.
150. Buffalo Law Journal, Judges & Court Calendars, http://www.lawjournal
buffalo.com/content/pages/judges#nys-supreme-court (last visited Sept. 3,
2009). There are also eight counties in the Eighth Judicial District. N.Y. State
Unified Court Sys., 8th Judicial District, http://www.nycourts.gov/
courts/8jd/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 3, 2009).
151. It is because of the volume of qualified judges that the rule of necessity is
now seldom invoked. See McKevitt, supra note 23, at 832-34 (giving examples of
modern applications of the rule of necessity); see also United States v. Will, 449
U.S. 200, 212 (1980) ("[T]he disqualified judge simply steps aside and allows the




increase in recusals resulting from the use of an objective
standard.
2. Giving the ACJE the Authority to Decide Recusal
Motions. Although an objective standard of recusal is
designed to take a judge's own opinions out of the recusal
process and instead ask what a reasonable person thinks, a
judge deciding a recusal motion often misapplies the
reasonable person standard and instead considers whether
she believes her impartiality might be in question.'52 Having
a judge rule on her own recusal has become "one of the most
heavily criticized features of United States disqualification
law."' Thus, in addition to adopting an objective standard
of recusal, New York must also change the way recusal
motions are decided.
One common solution to the problem of having a judge
decide her own recusal is for the judge to request that
another judge from the same court hear and decide the
motion. 5 Although this procedure is better than having a
judge rule on her own recusal, it is still flawed. First, a
certain collegiality exists between judges on the same
bench155-a judge may be unwilling to rule that a colleague
of hers is biased and unfit to preside over the case m
question. 56 Second, asking a judge to apply a reasonable
person standard to her colleague is problematic because a
judge is somewhat detached from how a reasonable person
views the court.'57 For example, the judge may be out of
touch with whether a layperson believes there is an
appearance of impropriety and whether the judge is capable
of presiding impartially.
Instead of allowing a judge or a judge's colleague to
decide recusal motions, New York needs to establish a new
type of independent review. The ACJE should be given the
power to decide recusal motions and issue binding opinions
152. See, e.g., FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 3, at 265 (explaining how Scalia
misapplied the objective standard found in § 455(a)).
153. Sample et al., supra note 38, at 31.
154. See id.
155. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 3, at 244.
156. See id.
157. See Pearson, supra note 44, at 1812 ("[T]he reasonable person is, at the
very least, not a judge.').
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that either compel a judge to recuse herself or allow her to
continue to preside over the case. Giving the ACJE this
authority would result in both efficient and effective review
of recusal motions.
The ACJE is currently comprised of a total of twenty-
four active and retired judges."' Whereas allowing a single
judge to decide a recusal motion is problematic in that a
judge might not think like a "reasonable person,"'59 the
number of judges on the ACJE and their combined
experience would ensure that New York's new objective test
is applied rationally. The ACJE also has nothing to lose or
gain by requiring a judge's recusal since its members would
be removed from the underlying case. If for some reason one
ACJE member was interested, her potential bias would
likely be a non-factor due to the sheer number of judges on
the Committee.
Granting the ACJE the power to decide recusal motions
would not be difficult. First, the ACJE is already codified in
the Judiciary Law."6° Simple changes to the section
providing for the creation of the ACJE and the new objective
statute could vest the ACJE with the power to both hear
recusal motions and issue binding opinions. Second, the
ACJE already has experience deciding recusal inquiries.'6
Instead of trying to make sense of section 14, the Rules of
Judicial Conduct, and appellate case law, the ACJE would
now only have to apply the newly codified objective
standard to the facts presented in each recusal motion. The
ACJE could also issue opinions using a per curiam-type
format where no single judge takes credit for granting or
denying the recusal motion. A per curiam process would
promote fairness and prevent a decision from being
attributed to an individual Committee member.
Allowing the ACJE to decide recusal motions would not
require a significant change to the procedure currently used
to secure a judge's recusal. Currently, a judge can either
recuse herself sua sponte, or a party can file a motion
158. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Current Roster, http://www.
courts.state.ny.uslip/acjelroster.shtml (last visited Sept. 3, 2009).
159. See Pearson, supra note 44, at 1812.
160. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 212(2)() (McKinney 2005).
161. See infra Part II.C.
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seeking the judge's recusal.'62 The same procedure can be
used under the amended law, except that instead of the
judge deciding the motion, the motion will immediately be
transferred to the ACJE. For efficiency's sake, a procedural
deadline should be established so that a party has to file the
motion before a certain point in the case. For example, a
motion should not be made after the commencement of the
trial. Not allowing a motion to be made after this point
would require parties to be diligent about recognizing a
potential conflict and also ensure that a party does not
submit a recusal motion merely to buy more time or delay a
proceeding.
After the motion is transferred to the ACJE, the
Committee should quickly issue a brief opinion either
granting or denying the motion and provide its reasoning.
In addition to supporting the Committee's reasoning, a
written opinion will create solid recusal precedent for future
ACJE opinions. Thus, when a party files a recusal motion in
the future, it can rely on the ACJE's opinions in making its
case. A party would also be able to consider recusal
precedent in determining whether to bother with a recusal
motion. Developing precedent may also have the additional
benefit of reducing the number of future recusal motions,
since a judge will have something to guide her when
deciding whether to recuse sua sponte. This new system of
precedent will finally bring predictability to recusal and
create a solid foundation of law-something that is lacking
under current recusal law.
Some judges and commentators may question the
soundness of vesting the power of deciding recusal motions
in an independent body. In response to this legitimate
worry, the new recusal standard will allow parties to appeal
ACJE decisions to the Court of Appeals. If this power of
review is given, care should be taken to make such appeals
a rare occurrence. First, the appeal should only be allowed
to be made at the conclusion of the underlying case. Second,
the Court of Appeals should give great deference to the
ACJE's decision, since the ACJE has the most experience
deciding recusal motions and has the unique ability to be
objective. 163 Finally, if the Court of Appeals decides that the
162. See People v. T & C Design, Inc., 680 N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (Just. Ct. 1998).
163. Despite criticism of the abuse of discretion standard of review throughout
this Comment, it would be a good standard to apply if the Court of Appeals were
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ACJE wrongly granted or denied recusal, the court should
be required to issue an opinion thoroughly explaining its
decision. Since the Court of Appeals is the highest court in
New York State, its decisions would also be binding on the
ACJE. Although appeals to the Court of Appeals should be
rare, giving the court the power of review will ensure that
the ACJE stays true to the newly adopted statutory
language.
If the ACJE is given the power to decide recusal
motions, its new authority may be challenged on
constitutional grounds. For example, a separation of powers
argument may be made contending that a legislatively-
created body that decides recusal motions improperly
encroaches on the judicial branch. This argument can be
countered in two ways.
First, the ACJE is made up in part by judges. Having a
different judge decide a recusal motion is a procedure
currently used in some states, including Texas, T and is
very similar to the procedure set forth in this Comment.
Second, under the new system of recusal, ACJE decisions
can be appealed to the Court of Appeals. Thus, while the
power to decide recusal motions will be taken away from a
judge and given to a legislatively-created body, the judicial
branch will still have final say over whether recusal is
proper and will also be in control over this part of judiciary
law. In any event, transferring recusal motions to the ACJE
is a very slight impingement on judicial freedom, and is one
that is needed to ensure confidence in the judiciary.
Although this Comment is primarily about recusal of
trial court judges, part of the proposed system of recusal can
also be applied to appellate judges. Like federal law, all
New York judges should be subject to an objective standard
of recusal. But, because the Court of Appeals has final say
over decisions made by the ACJE, it may not be practical to
allow recusal motions from that court to be transferred to
the ACJE. At the appellate level, therefore, it will be best to
allow each judge to decide her own recusal motion using the
allowed to review decisions of the ACJE. It would give the ACJE some breathing
room to develop precedent, but would also allow the Court of Appeals to correct
any egregious errors made by the ACJE.
164. See Sample et al., supra note 38, at 31 (explaining that Texas allows a
judge faced with a recusal motion to refer the motion to another judge).
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new objective criteria. Appellate judges should, however, be
bound by any precedent created by the Court of Appeals
resulting from its review of ACJE opinions.
Recusal is a sensitive subject in that it challenges a
judge's integrity and ability to decide cases on the merits.
While giving an independent body the authority to decide
recusal motions is a radical proposal, it is the most effective
way to ensure that the objective language of a recusal
statute is correctly applied. It will also protect the integrity
of the judicial system in that the press and public will be
able to rest assured that a judge is not sitting in a case in
order to further her own interest.'65 Finally, giving the
ACJE the power to apply an objective standard to recusal
motions will also help alleviate concerns shared by current
judges that they should recuse themselves from a variety of
cases that are in some way connected to the judicial pay
raise controversy in New York.
B. Recusal and the Judicial Pay Raise Controversy
At the time of this Comment's publication, the New
York judiciary is embroiled in a dispute with the New York
State Legislature regarding pay raises for state judges."
On April 10, 2008, former Chief Judge of the New York
Court of Appeals Judith Kaye sued leaders of the New York
State Assembly and Senate as well as Governor David
Paterson, demanding a pay raise on behalf of all state
judges.'67 Kaye's lawsuit seeks to raise the salary of state
supreme court justices from $136,700 to $169,300,168 the
latter figure being the current salary of federal district court
judges.' 9 In addition to Kaye's lawsuit, two other lawsuits
165. The recent uproar over Judge Benjamin's decision not to recuse himself in
Caperton comes to mind here. See, e.g., Editorial, Honest Justice, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2009, at A26; Editorial, Justice Not for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009,
at A26.
166. See Eligon, supra note 6.
167. Golding, supra note 6. Despite Kaye's recent retirement, newly appointed
Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman has also begun to lobby for pay raises for New
York's judges. Robert Gavin, Chief Judge Set to Tackle Pay Issue, ALBANY TIMES
UNION, Feb. 12, 2009, at A3.
168. Daniel Wise, Recusals Could Lead to Discipline, Conduct Commission




brought by state court judges seeking a salary increase have
recently been decided by two different appellate divisions. '70
In Maron v. Silver, the Appellate Division, Third
Department, heard an appeal from plaintiff judges who
brought a proceeding seeking a writ of mandamus
compelling the state to "maintain judicial salaries apace
with inflation" and to disburse funds that had previously
been appropriated by the Legislature for a pay raise. 7' In
support of their requested relief, the plaintiffs made claims
based on: (1) the Compensation Clause of the New York
Constitution; (2) separation of powers; (3) the Equal
Protection Clause; and (4) mandamus."'
New York's Compensation Clause provides that the
compensation of a judge "shall not be diminished during [his
or her] term of office."'73 The plaintiffs argued that because
the level of judicial compensation-which had not been
increased since 1999--did not compensate for inflation or an
increase in cost of living, salaries were effectively
diminished."74 The court rejected this claim, reasoning that
mere inflation "cannot be deemed a sufficient basis for a
claim under New York's Compensation Clause."7 '
The plaintiffs' second argument was based on
separation of powers. To support a claim for a violation of
separation of powers, the judicial branch must show that
the Legislature's actions were designed to influence the
170. See Larabee v. Governor, 880 N.Y.S.2d 256 (App. Div. 2009); Maron v.
Silver, 871 N.Y.S.2d 404 (App. Div. 2008).
171. 871 N.Y.S.2d at 406. The 2006-2007 state budget included a $69.5 million
appropriation for salary adjustments. Id. at 406. Similarly, the 2009 state
budget includes a $48 million appropriation for salary adjustments, but no
authorization for the increase. Noeleen G. Walder, First Department Backs
Judicial Pay Raise, N.Y. L.J., June 3, 2009, at 1.
172. Maron, 871 N.Y.S.2d at 406-07.
173. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 25(a)). A similar
provision is contained in the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1
("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.").
174. Maron, 871 N.Y.S.2d at 406, 409.
175. Id. at 414.
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judiciary or attack its independence.'76 The plaintiffs
contended that the Legislature's failure to grant a pay
increase was designed to influence the judiciary because it
demonstrated the Legislature's displeasure over certain
decisions, and also caused a number of judges to resign from
the bench or to not seek re-election.'77  The Third
Department rejected this argument, reasoning that the
judges' failure to cite to any hard evidence in support of
these claims made their arguments merely speculative.'
Finally, the court quickly rejected both the Equal
Protection and mandamus arguments. There was no denial
of Equal Protection since the plaintiffs "failed to negate
every conceivable rational basis for the Legislature's
inaction,"'' 79  and there was no basis for mandamus
compelling the state comptroller to release the appropriated
funds in part since the previous legislation did not provide
for their dispersal, but instead only made the funds
available. 180
Less than seven months after Maron was decided the
Appellate Division, First Department, held in Larabee v.
Governor that the Legislature's failure to grant judicial pay
raises violated separation of powers.'
Like Maron, the First Department looked to whether
the Legislature interfered with the judicial branch's "own
ability to function." 182 Unlike Maron, the court did not
require specific evidence showing a "present impairment of
the judicial system."'8 3 Instead, the court held that the
Legislature had improperly subordinated the judicial
branch by "linking" judicial salaries with other issues."'
176. Id.
177. Id. at 416.
178. Id. at 416-17.
179. Id. at 420.
180. Id. at 421-22.
181. 880 N.Y.S.2d 256, 273 (App. Div. 2009). The court did agree with the
Maron court in that there was no violation of the Compensation Clause. Id. at
265.
182. Id. at 272.
183. Id. at 274.
184. Id. at 274-75.
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"Linkage" is the practice of combining two different
platforms in one piece of legislation.'85 The Legislature
engaged in this practice when it combined judicial pay
raises with unrelated issues, such as legislative salaries and
campaign finance reform.'86 The First Department believed
that linkage turned judicial pay raise legislation into a mere
"tactical weapon," and, as a result, made the judiciary an
"inferior governmental entity."'87 The court thus affirmed
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered
judicial compensation adjusted to reflect increases in the
cost of living that occurred since the last pay raise over ten
years ago."'
Kaye's lawsuit, Chief Judge v. Governor, was decided by
the same state supreme court that issued the lower court
opinion in Larabee.8 0 Like Larabee, the court held that
linkage violated the doctrine of separation of powers and
ordered the state to increase judicial salaries.'90 A motion is
now pending before the Court of Appeals to take the case on
direct appeal.'° The Court of Appeals has already agreed to
hear appeals in Maron and Larabee, and is expected to
combine those cases and issue a decision in late 2009 or
early 2010 on whether the state must grant a judicial pay
raise. 92
The judicial pay raise controversy and the above three
cases have raised a slew of recusal issues. For example, as a
result of these lawsuits, several state judges have recused
themselves from cases where a state legislator's law firm
185. See id. at 261.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 274.
188. Id. at 275.
189. See Daniel Wise, News in Brief Lehner Again Orders Albany to Raise
Judges' Salaries, N.Y. L.J., June 16, 2009, at 1. The case was decided by
Supreme Court, New York County less than two weeks after the First
Department's decision in Larabee. See id.
190. Chief Judge v. Governor, No. 400763/08, 2009 WL 1652845, at *2-3 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 15, 2009).
191. See Stashenko, supra note 7.
192. See id.; see also Walder, supra note 171 (stating that judicial pay raises
will likely not be granted by the state in 2009 because of the "grim economy,"
thus making it likely that the issue will not be resolved until the Court of
Appeals has its say).
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represents a party.'93 Instead of basing their recusals on
bias, it has been suggested that the judges are recusing
themselves in protest of the Legislature's failure to grant
the pay raise." Even worse, one court insider noted that
judges were playing "hardball" and threatening to tie up
cases connected to lawmakers.'95
In response to a wave of recusals by state court judges,
the ACJE has already issued several advisory opinions
concerning the pay raise controversy,'96 the most recent of
which stating that Kaye's lawsuit did not require a judge to
recuse herself in a case involving a state legislator.' 7 In
addition to the ACJE opinions, the Commission on Judicial
Conduct-the state body in charge of disciplining judges-
recently issued a statement warning judges that a violation
of one of the ACJE's opinions concerning recusal could be
interpreted by the Commission as being a violation of the
Rules Governing Judicial Conduct. 9 ' But, since the ACJE
also provided in its pay raise advisory opinions that a judge
must recuse herself if she is convinced she cannot be fair,1
judges may still continue to recuse themselves from cases
193. Golding, supra note 6.
194. Id.
195. Id.





197..N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-76 (2008),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/udicialethics/opinions/08-76-08-84_08-88_08-
89.htm.
198. N.Y. State Comm. on Judicial Conduct, Statement by the New York State
Commission on Judicial Conduct Regarding Judicial Compensation (May 12,
2008), http://www.scjc.state.ny.usPolicy%20Statements/CJC_
Statement.JudicialCompensation.200805_12.pdf. The Commission also noted
that recusal as a form of protest could violate section 100.3(B)(4) of the Rules,
which provides that a "judge shall perform the duties of judicial office
impartially and fairly." Id.; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 100.3(B)(4)
(2006)).
199. See N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Jud. Ethics, Op. 08-76 (2008),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/judicialethics/opinions/08-76_08-84_08-88_08-
89.htm; Op. 07-190 (2007), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/udicialethics/
opinions/07-90.htm.
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involving legislators."° As one judge argued: "how could
there not be a conflict if I were to sit upon a case involving a
firm of one of the lawyers who sets my salary?"' '
In addition to recusal, Maron, Larabee, and Chief Judge
have resurrected debate over the rule of necessity. The rule
of necessity, which provides that a judge can sit in a case in
which she is interested if there is no other judge available,
is seldom applicable due to the large number of judges in
today's legal system. 2
Despite its rarity, the rule of necessity has already been
invoked in Maron. In Maron, the Third Department
admitted that the court was interested in the outcome of the
case, but stated that it was "required to hear and dispose of
the[] cross appeals pursuant to the rule of necessity.""03 The
rule of necessity will likely apply once Maron and Larabee
are heard by the Court of Appeals, in that while the judges
would benefit from an increase in judicial salaries, all other
judges in New York would also benefit."°
Although the Court of Appeals will likely invoke the
rule of necessity, Chief Judge Lippman has already stated
that since he is the plaintiff in Chief Judge, he will recuse
himself in any pay raise cases that come before the court.0 5
While Lippman's recusal in the pay raise cases is
appropriate since he is a named party and an activist for
increasing judicial salaries, whether other judges should
recuse themselves in cases involving state legislators and
their respective law firms is not as cut and dry due to
confusion over conflicting ACJE opinions and the state's
subjective recusal standard. To compare, the new recusal
standard set forth in this Comment would have eliminated
any confusion over whether recusal was required in these
types of cases.
200. See Wise, supra note 168.
201. Id.
202. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also Joel Stashenko, 'Rule
of Necessity' Could be Invoked in Judicial Pay Suits, N.Y. L.J., July 21, 2009, at
1 (noting that the rule of necessity is rarely used by the Court of Appeals, but
citing two cases in the last quarter century in which it was used).
203. Maron v. Silver, 871 N.Y.S.2d 404, 407 (App. Div. 2008).
204. See Stashenko, supra note 202.
205. Stashenko, supra note 7.
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If the ACJE was allowed to issue binding opinions based
on an objective standard, the current recusal controversy
could have been quickly ended. First, at some point, a party
likely would have motioned for a judge's recusal in a case
involving a legislator's firm due to an alleged appearance of
bias. Then, applying an objective standard, the ACJE would
have held that the judge need not recuse herself since the
relationship between the pay raise controversy and a
legislator's law firm is tenuous at best-a reasonable person
would not question a judge's impartiality simply because a
legislator's firm, not the actual legislator, was appearing
before the judge.
After this first recusal motion was decided, both judges
and litigants would be faced with binding precedent
providing that a judge should not recuse herself because of
one of the three lawsuits. A party would not waste its time
motioning for a judge's recusal in the face of such precedent,
and a judge would risk discipline if she recused sua sponte
in spite of the ACJE's decision.
As the law now stands, a judge can still recuse herself
from a case involving a legislator's firm so long as the judge
argues she is incapable of being fair."6 Allowing a judge to
use this loophole in spite of ACJE advisory opinions and the
Commission on Judicial Conduct's warning is a
contemporary example of the decrepit state of New York
recusal law. Because of the strict standard of review and
difficulty of disciplining judges, a judge who does recuse
herself will face few, if any, consequences. Giving the ACJE
legitimate power and allowing it to apply an objective
recusal standard to judges would have put an early end to
the possibility of judges using recusal as a strategy to secure
a pay raise. Thus, the current deadlock between the
judiciary and the state regarding pay raises is yet another
example of why New York must act and change its recusal
law.
CONCLUSION
Because of the sensitive nature of recusal, any change
in New York recusal law will likely receive a fair amount of





attention and criticism. In spite of this possibility, a change
is imperative. New York can no longer rely on a statute that
gives almost complete discretion to a judge in determining
whether she should recuse herself. Instead, New York needs
to abolish its subjective recusal standard and adopt an
objective standard that is applied uniformly by a
disinterested board of judges. Until then, full confidence in
the judicial system will be lacking due to cases that raise
the appearance of impropriety and call a judge's
impartiality into question.
By no means will an objective recusal standard require
a judge to act like a robot who merely applies the law to the
facts. For one, it might very well be impossible for a judge to
be completely impartial.207 Further, it is beyond dispute that
judges are indeed human and perfection on the part of the
judiciary-although an admirable goal-is likely impossible.
Recognizing these considerations, an objective recusal
standard applied by an independent body will save judges
from making difficult decisions regarding their impartiality.
Although a judge may be against having her impartiality
evaluated by an independent body, the new system will save
a judge from the often unfair and undeserved criticism
levied on her by the press and public when she declines to
recuse herself. In any event, adopting the new system will
help restore confidence in the judicial system by showing
litigants, judges, and the public that New York fully
supports the right to a fair trial and is working to protect
that right. Perhaps more importantly, the new system will
also prevent future uproars similar to today's pay raise
controversy that have the potential to harm the reputations
of the judicial system and the judges that have served it
with honor and distinction since New York's inception.
207. See BOB WOODWARD & Scorr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 214 (1979)
(stating that U.S. Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell believed a "perfectly fair
trial was an illusion").
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